Of the whole world we may inquire what is its magnitude, what its duration is, and nothing else. And seeing a necessary cause is defined to be that, which being supposed, the effect cannot by follow; this also may be collected, that whatsoever effect is produced at any time, the same is produced by a necessary cause.
All bodies therefore differ from one another in number ; namely, as one and another; so that the same and different in number , are names opposed to one another by contradiction. And from hence springs the great controversy among philosophers about the beginning of individuation , namely, in what sense it may be conceived that a body is at one time the same, at another time not the same as it was formerly. Humanity: Our selves are just matter in motion. Streaming and Download help.
Report this album or account. If you like The Death Of Escapism, you may also like:. Unapologetic Baltimore punk with a NYHC touch, sweetened with just enough melody as needed to lure newcomers into the pit. FSR46 - Dreams About In Condemnation by Pandemix. Rousseau tries to capture the effects of society, or civilization, on human beings in the following passage:.
The savage and the civilized man, differ so much in the bottoms of their hearts and in their inclinations, that what constitutes the supreme happiness of one would reduce the 'other to despair.
The former breathes only peace and liberty; he desires only to live and be free from labour; even the ataraxia of the Stoic falls far short of his profound indifference to every other object.
Civilized man, on the other hand, is always moving, sweating, toiling, and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations: he goes on in drudgery to his last moment, and even seeks death to put himself in a position to live, or renounces life to acquire immortality.
He pays his court to men in power, whom he hates, and to the wealthy, whom he despises; he stops at nothing to have the honour of serving them; he is not ashamed to value himself on his own meanness and their protection; and, proud of his slavery, he speaks with disdain of those, who have not the honour of sharing it.
What a sight would the perplexing and envied labours of a European minister of State present to the eyes of a Caribbean! How many cruel deaths would not this indolent savage prefer to the horrors of such a life, which is seldom even sweetened by the pleasure of doing good! But, for him to see into the motives of all this solicitude the words 'power' and 'reputation' would have to bear some meaning in his mind; he would have to know that there are men who set a value on the opinion of the rest of the world; who can be made happy and satisfied with themselves rather on the testimony of other people than on their own.
In reality, the source of all these differences is, that the savage lives within himself, while social man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him. It is not to my present purpose to insist on the indifference to good and evil which arises from this disposition, in spite of our many fine works on morality, or to show how, everything being reduced to appearances, there is but art and mummery in even honour, friendship, virtue, and often vice itself, of which we at length learn the secret of boasting; to show, in short, how, always asking others, what we are, and never daring to ask ourselves, in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity, and civilization, and of such sublime codes of morality, we have nothing to show for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance, honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness.
It is sufficient that I have proved that this is not by any means the original state of man, but that it is merely the spirit of society, and the inequality which society produces, that thus transform and alter all our natural inclinations. Whereas Hobbes relies upon reason and the threat of powerful, centralized authority to provide an ethical and social system that controls human nature, Rousseau trusts human nature and advocates opportunity for its free expression.
Rousseau thinks that society suppresses the good, natural feelings in our nature and reason often constructs elaborately artificial rationalizations that smother our sense of compassion and justify horrendous acts. He does not oppose the use of reason itself; but he opposes this smothering of feelings for the sake of being rational. The origin of morality lies simply in our natural feelings, prior to any exact reasoning; and reason is as likely to become a tool of social corruption as it is likely to become an instrument for good.
For Rousseau, being able to will freely what we want to do, taking our natural feelings into account, makes for a happy, healthy, moral person. Hobbes, on the other hand, does not trust natural feelings. Natural feelings incline human beings to be self-interested power-seekers, quarrelsome by nature, covetous for what others have, and petty about their reputations.
Give these feelings free rein and the result is a state of war. Reason and governmental power are our best protection from the dangerous tendencies within our own nature. Both Hobbes and Rousseau regard self-interest as a fundamental element in human nature. For Hobbes, all voluntary actions are naturally directed in the service of self-interest; accordingly, all his moral and socio-political recommendations are directed toward an "enlightened" self-interest.
Thus peace is not desirable for the sake of humanity; rather it is desirable because it serves each individual's own self-interest. Hobbes never issues altruistic exhortations! But Rousseau does. While he grants the important function of self-preservation, or self-love, he tempers the significance of this function by recognizing also the place of compassion and conscience as principles of action in human nature. Provided that society has not corrupted our sense of self-interest to the point where it becomes ravenous in its demands, the principles of compassion and conscience offer ample incentives to serve the interests of our fellow human beings.
Whereas Rousseau locates the origin of morality in human nature itself, Hobbes locates it in the more complex functions of reason, cooperative agreement, and governmental power.
The existence of moral rules, effective in practice, requires specific sorts of social relationships. There is no morality embedded in human nature. Accordingly, Hobbes admits a condition of amorality, namely, a state of war, in which no moral rules apply and "anything goes.
The demands of compassion and conscience always remain within us. In the interest of self-preservation, and self-love, we have the right to take those steps necessary for our protection, freedom, and basic wants. Given their differences with respect to human nature, we are not surprised by their consequent differences regarding the state of nature, the effects of society, and the proper directing of human life.
When we examine the evidence Hobbes offers in support of his "description" of the state of nature, we find it pretty weak. His claim that many Native Americans lived in the state of nature just shows the shallowness of seventeenth century anthropology.
People lock their doors and chests because they fear a small minority, not because they fear human beings generally. And nations recognize some principles of international law and morality. Thus there is scant reason to accept his account of the state of nature. A Possible Reply: If society were to remove its laws and system of law enforcement, you would start to find it approximating more and more closely to the state of nature as described by Hobbes.
We observe this trend occurring whenever there is a breakdown of "law and order. We only have to witness the great rise in crime and violence in subcultures where law enforcement is ineffective.
While nations pay "lip service" to all sorts of noble principles, what they do in practice occurs according to the amount of power they possess and can achieve. Nations will never respect any principles of morality contrary to their national interest until there is a common power capable of enforcing morality. In other words, an international government is necessary for a state of peace and the rule of morality among nations.
Besides compassion and self-preservation, we also find aggressiveness to be a basic principle within human nature. People sometimes feel compassion; but sometimes they also revel in the sufferings of others.
Society may create conditions that provoke more aggression; but the principle of aggression already exists as a fundamental element in human nature. If Rousseau still insists that aggressiveness is a socially produced phenomenon, we can assert just as strongly that compassion is a socially produced phenomenon, too.
A Possible Reply: What distinguishes compassion from aggressiveness as principles of action is the fact that compassion is a primary, original feeling in human beings whereas aggressiveness is a secondary, produced feeling due to human inequality. Human beings are not naturally aggressive.
The full text of Leviathan is available at Oregon State. Included here is a selection from Hobbes' discussion of the natural condition of mankind state of nature from the Leviathan.
A select bibliography follows the selection. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself. And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science, which very few have and but in few things, as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after some what else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength.
For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men that how so ever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance.
But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing than that every man is contented with his share. From this equality of ability arise the quality of hope in the attaining of our ends.
And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power, if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty.
And the invader again is in the like danger of another. And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.
Also, because there be some that, taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.
And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him. Again, men have no pleasure but on the contrary a great deal of grief in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he dares which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other , to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather.
For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace. Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal.
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
When in fact the majority of Servants engage in their sacred duty and are primarily neutral. It's rare for a Servant to be evil of any kind. This bad omen belief causes servants to hide their true identity, and they all become masters of diplomacy and disguise.
It is also true that when in human form most servants cause some kind of admiration in humans, maybe it is something to do with their master? We may never know. Abilities: Charisma is the primary ability for the servants, the majority of their special feats and spells requires it. Wisdom is pretty important as well, too use spells and magic, the other abilities are second handed due to the fact that Servants are a hybrid class and do not excel in combat as barbarians and warriors.
Races: Humans are the best and most common servants, the human's poor longevity and fragility makes them the best race for death subjects and comprehension.
Weapon and Armor Proficiency: Death Servants are proficient with all simple weapons and their chosen weapon "death weapon" Ex , light armor and no shields.Jun 24, · Clearly, though Locke is more popular than Hobbes, Hobbes still has a constituency. The question that divided them is still a live one: Does a tyrant, who seizes power by force, who is obeyed from fear, have a right to rule? Hobbes resembles Machiavelli in that more people agree with him and live by his rules than would admit to it.